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Reclaiming the Radical in Universal Human Rights: Universality as 
Universalisation 
 Kathryn McNeilly 





The universality of human rights has been a fiercely contested issue throughout their 
history. This article contributes to scholarly engagements with the universality of 
human rights by proposing a re-engagement with this concept in a way that is 
compatible with the aims of radical politics. Instead of a static attribute or characteristic 
of rights this article proposes that universality can be thought of as, drawing from Judith 
Butler, an ongoing process of universalisation. Universality accordingly emerges as a 
site of powerful contest between competing ideas of what human rights should mean, 
do or say, and universal concepts are continually reworked through political activity. 
This leads to a differing conception of rights politics than traditional liberal approaches 
but, moreover, challenges such approaches. This understanding of universality allows 
human rights to come into view as potentially of use in interrupting liberal regimes and, 
crucially, opens possibilities to reclaim the radical in rights.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The universality, or otherwise, of human rights discourse has been a persistent staple 
in scholarly engagements with human rights, as well as in the everyday politics of rights 
more generally. Indeed, universality is arguably one of the most important issues human 
rights have faced, and continue to face, in the contemporary era. This is an era of 
declining universality, where human rights represent perhaps one of the last discourses 
still conceptualised in the universal terms of modernity.1 The issue of universality has 
been tied to the legitimacy and authority of human rights, to their scope and remit as 
well as to the way in which human rights can be thought to operate at the grassroots 
level. A myriad of divergent views have been expressed on the universality of human 
rights; some embracing a strict universalist approach, others highlighting the dangers 
                                                        
1 C Douzinas, ‘The Poverty of (Rights) Jurisprudence’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The 
Cambridge Companion to Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 56 at 57. 
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this represents and seeking to offer alternative positions, some even going so far as to 
abandon the idea of universal human rights altogether. In this context a number of 
questions emerge. How can we conceive of the universality of human rights in the 
contemporary political and legal landscape? Can the universality of human rights be 
revisited in a productive way capable of meeting the politico-legal challenges of our 
current time? Moreover, what is the relationship between this contested universality of 
human rights and the everyday politics of rights?  
 
In this article I engage in a reconsideration of the universality of human rights. What 
this reconsideration seeks to do is propose a convincing way to conceptualise universal 
human rights which is compatible with, and useful for, scholarship and activism 
challenging liberalism and urging towards radical social transformation.2 I assert that 
instead of abandoning universal human rights as a discourse incapable of furthering 
radical political aims, it is possible to return to the universality of human rights in an 
alternative way which works human rights beyond their current limitations within 
liberalism – reinforcement of ideas of rational individualism, formal equality and 
already existing regimes of power, for example – and facilitates the aims of radical 
politics. I consider this is possible through conceiving the universality of human rights 
as not a static attribute or characteristic of rights, but, drawing from the work of Judith 
Butler,3 as an ongoing process of universalisation whereby the meaning, content and 
remit of universal human rights is constantly made and remade in political engagement 
and activity.  
 
This approach visibilises the universality of human rights as a ‘not yet’, a site of 
powerful contest between competing understandings of universal concepts within 
which the exclusions of the dominant universal are continually challenged and 
reworked. In this view, a final and fully inclusive closure of what universal human 
rights mean and who their subject is, as well as their ultimate realisation, always 
                                                        
2 Throughout this article I will use the terms ‘radical’ and ‘radical politics’ in the sense of a form of leftist 
politics which involves a profound challenge to existing relations of power for those who are 
marginalised or excluded, in particular within liberalism, using a range of post-Marxist and 
poststructuralist resources. 
3 See generally, J Butler, Gender Trouble Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 2nd 
ed, (London, Routledge, 2006); J Butler Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (New 
York; London, Routledge, 1993); J Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, 2nd 
ed, (London, Verso, 2006); J Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?  (London, Verso, 2009). 
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remains a futural attainment; one we can never achieve but which draws us into striving 
towards it nevertheless. In contrast to liberal understandings of universality, this 
alternative approach to the politics of universal human rights fundamentally 
foregrounds both the unfixity of human rights and the relations of power shaping their 
current articulations, allowing allows us to visibilise, and indeed challenge, the way in 
which liberal approaches to human rights and their universality may foreclose such 
unfixity and further restrictive regimes of power. It is this aspect of reconsidering the 
universality of human rights as universalisation which allows a potential compatibility 
between universal human rights, conceived in such an alternative way, and radical 
politics seeking to challenge liberalism and its regimes of power more generally to 
come into view. Understanding the universality of human rights as a site of ongoing 
contest maintained through the challenge of those currently excluded from dominant 
universal concepts or understandings allows radical politics to see how human rights 
may be used to interrupt liberal regimes of power and, in turn, opens possibilities to 
reclaim the radical in rights.  
 
2. Traditional Approaches to Universality  
 
Beginning to consider the context within which the reconsideration of universality I am 
proposing here is located, it is necessary to understand how the universality of human 
rights has been traditionally approached. General discussion surrounding human rights 
demonstrates both the importance of universality to contemporary human rights politics 
and the stumbling block that universality has posed to human rights throughout their 
history. In scholarly literature much of this discussion has intersected with one of the 
most fundamental debates on human rights; the deep-seated divide between 
universality and cultural relativity which has dominated discussion over recent 
decades. 4  The universality/cultural relativist binary can be regarded as framing 
traditional approaches to the universality of human rights. It would be amiss to engage 
with the universality of human rights without reference to this key divide, and this 
                                                        
4 See, eg, AD Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism. (London, Sage, 
1990); F Halliday, ‘Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: the Case of the Islamic Middle East’ 
(1995) 43(1) Political Studies 152-167; E Brems ‘Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism 
as Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse’ (1997) 19(1) Human Rights Quarterly 136-164; B 
Ackerly, Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
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debate indeed forms the marker which the re-engagement of universality I am 
proposing emerges from, and seeks to move beyond. While the debate on 
universality/cultural relativity forms a starting point for discussion on universality, as 
will be elaborated below, it is not necessarily an ending point for contemporary 
engagements with the universality of human rights, in particular those which seek to 
recover human rights as a truly radical discourse not necessarily confined within 
liberalism and capable of meaningfully challenging current regimes of power. In what 
follows below these traditional approaches to the universality of human rights will be 
explored as a prelude before introducing how we can begin to think about the issue of 
universality anew to allow a more radical view of universal human rights to emerge.  
 
Discussion on the universality of rights has taken on a particular importance, and indeed 
a new direction, following increasing globalisation of the international system in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. The coming together of diverse nations, cultures 
and socio-religious viewpoints under the umbrella of ‘international human rights’ has 
brought particular challenges to the fore.5 However, as Chris Brown highlights,6 the 
question of universality is one that has a longer pedigree, and the historico-theoretical 
foundations of rights provide a deeper context to this debate. Human rights have 
traditionally asserted, firstly, universality in relation to the subject of rights. Stemming 
back to their natural law underpinnings in work such as that of Hobbes and Locke,7 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts in its opening Article that ‘all human 
beings are born equal in dignity and rights’. All possess rights, it is advanced, because 
of their basic humanity; human rights protection extends universally across humankind. 
In addition to a universal subject, secondly, the content of human rights is also 
presented as universal. This universality combines the natural law underpinnings of 
rights, in terms of certain core protections which reflect a common conception of human 
                                                        
5 See, ege, B Ibhawoh, ‘Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human 
Rights in the African State’ (2000) 22(3) Human Rights Quarterly 838-860; S Engle Merry, ‘Human 
Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (And Anthropology Along the Way)’ (2003) 26(1) Political 
and Legal Anthropology Review 55-76; H Dahan Kalev, ‘Cultural Rights or Human Rights: The Case of 
Female Genital Mutilation’ (2004) 51(5-6) Sex Roles 339-348. 
6 C Brown, ‘Universal Human Rights: A Critique’ (1997) 1(2) International Journal of Human Rights 
41-65 at 41. 
7 For deeper discussion on the philosophical underpinnings of rights see C Douzinas, The End of Human 
Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) at 23-84; P 
Jones, Rights (MacMillan, London, 1994); H Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994); S 
Shute and S Hurley (eds), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, Basic 
Books, 1994); J Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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flourishing, with positive law in the contemporary international context. From the mid-
twentieth century international human rights law positivised particular rights content, 
upholding protection from certain harms, or access to certain values or goods deemed 
important within liberalism, as universal provisions. The current international human 
rights regime, for the most part, represents ‘a contemporary, internationalised and 
universalised, version of the liberal position on rights’.8 The content of human rights, 
especially the foundational first generation civil and political rights, has been enshrined 
in treaties and declarations applying across borders, nations and cultures.  
 
The assertion stemming from the position outlined above – that human rights apply to 
all human subjects and consist of a set core content of protections applicable across 
borders and contexts – broadly summarises the universalist position on human rights.9 
This has been the general starting point from which human rights law and politics 
progressed from 1945 onwards. However, in the latter decades of the twentieth century 
concern began to emerge, particularly from voices in the Global South, that this 
universalist approach, and its associated politico-legal crusade to extend the profile and 
reach of human rights in the post-World War II era was problematic. Such a position 
was increasingly articulated as representing, as Conor Gearty puts it,  
 
a new form of imperial aggression, with the assertion of human rights fulfilling 
the function of Christianity and civilisation in bygone ages namely the latest way 
in which a rapacious west covers its selfish tracks, hiding its naked self-interest 
in a shabby ethical coat.10  
 
The subject of human rights in this view is not a universal human but a Western 
construct and the universal content of rights articulated in international law appears as 
an all too familiar assertion of colonial power, inattentive to cultural particularities, 
promoting a Eurocentric approach to human life and its flourishing.11 In this view, 
                                                        
8 Brown, supra n. 6 at 43. 
9 For further discussion on the universalist approach see J Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory 
and Practice 3rd ed, (London, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2013) at 94-97.  
10  C Gearty, ‘Are Human Rights Truly Universal?’ (2008) Available at: 
<http://www.conorgearty.co.uk/pdfs/Chapter_29_UniversalityFINAL.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2015) 
at 5. 
11 See W Twinning, ‘Human Rights: Southern Voices; Francis Deng, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Yash Ghai 
and Upendra Baxi’ (2007) Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal, available at: 
<http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/twining> (accessed 12 October 2015); R Wilson, 
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human rights cannot take a universal form and, indeed, to assert a universalist position 
renders rights not only of limited utility but also potentially damaging to the cultures 
they are seeking to embed themselves in.  
 
This traditional binarised perspective on the universality of rights will be familiar to 
anyone with even a cursory knowledge of human rights discourse and politics. 
However, many alternative perspectives have been taken on the universality/cultural 
relativity debate and, it should be noted, in more recent times engagement with the 
universality of human rights in mainstream literature has veered away from a strictly 
binarised approach to this debate in favour of more nuanced articulation of the nature 
of the universal and particular in rights.12 Much scholarly engagement has considered 
how the universality of human rights can be approached in a way which eschews the 
binarisation of universality-relativity. Some have sought to maintain the universality of 
human rights while simultaneously seeking to temper the colonisation and more sinister 
elements it can give rise to.13 Others have taken a contrasting route, rejecting the 
universality of human rights as of any use in the contemporary era, and urging towards 
alternative perspectives on rights. 14  Others still have proposed a return to the 
universality of human rights albeit in a new form, one which is quite different from the 
universality envisaged by liberal, universalist approaches. 15  Indeed, while the 
universality/cultural relativist debate has done much to highlight the imperialistic 
                                                        
‘Introduction’ in R Wilson (ed), Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives 
(London, Pluto Press, 1997) 1. 
12 For example, Jack Donnelly explores how rights are ‘relatively universal’, asserting that ‘the crucial 
work, then is to identify the ways in which human rights both are and are not relative and universal – and 
to avoid either treating the universal as if it were relative or falsely universalizing [sic] the particular’, 
Donnelly, supra n. 9 at 104.  
13 To provide some examples; Conor Gearty advances a re-narration of human rights, ‘one that is more 
convincing and better able to appeal to the global community as a truly universal discourse’, Gearty, 
supra n. 10 at 6; Jack Donnelly advances a recognition of human rights as both universal and relative in 
various ways, Donnelly, supra n. 9 at 104; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im has worked to show how 
universal human rights may be compatible with Islamic law and how the latter can be reworked to 
produce a better relationship between the two; AA An-Na’im, ‘Universality of Human Rights: An 
Islamic Perspective’ in N Ando (ed) Japan Past, Present and Future: International Symposium to Mark 
the Centennial of the Japanese Association of International Law (The Hague; London; Boston, Kluwer 
Law International, 1999) 311. 
14 These authors include Douzinas, supra n. 7 at 12; Brown, supra n. 6 and R Rorty Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers Volume 3 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 170.  
15 See D Otto, ‘Rethinking the “Universality” of Human Rights Law (1997) 1(1) Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review 1-46; D Otto, ‘Rethinking Universals: Opening Transformative Possibilities in International 
Human Rights Law’ (1997) 18 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1-36; D Otto, ‘Everything is 
Dangerous: Some Poststructuralist Tools for Rethinking the Universal Knowledge Claims of Human 
Rights Law (1999) 5(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 17-47. 
 7 
tendencies of liberal human rights, it has nevertheless tied the discussion of human 
rights and their universality closely to liberalism. From this perspective, the universality 
of human rights appears as a fixed attribute to be either endorsed or contested. Much of 
the return to universality in ways that seek to reject the liberal dominance of human 
rights discourse has drawn sustenance from the poststructuralist and critical re-
evaluation of universality in recent years which, as Linda Zerilli states, represented ‘a 
homecoming to Enlightenment ideals – purified of their more poisonous elements, of 
course – and a reconciliation of sorts between those who refuted those ideals and those 
who sought to realise them’.16 It is this latter category which is of interest to the aims 
of this article, introducing how the universality of human rights may be used as a 
starting point to envisage an alternative conception of universal human rights and one, 
specifically, that may begin to reclaim the radical in human rights. While liberal 
understandings of universality as a fixed or static attribute of human rights serve to 
bolster current regimes of power – who is the subject of human rights, what central 
ideas such as equality and non-discrimination mean, for example – and often present 
such as timeless and taken for granted, critical approaches have revealed how 
universality may not necessarily be tied to a bolstering of such regimes.17  
 
While some work staying with universality and re-evaluating it in a new way has clearly 
taken place in critical literature, it has not yet taken hold or, apparently, proved fully 
convincing. What discussion in the present article aims to do is to remedy this situation; 
to offer a convincing alternative account of the universality of human rights that 
resonates with current understandings of human rights and also holds potential to propel 
human rights forward into a more radical practice which is accessible to both 
mainstream understandings of human rights – convincing them that such a re-
engagement will lead to a better practice of rights – and more critical approaches – 
convincing them that the liberal shortcomings of human rights, in terms of reifying as 
opposed to radically challenging current power relations, can be addressed by starting 
from this perspective. This offers an alternative to staying within the parameters of the 
                                                        
16 L Zerilli, ‘This Universalism Which Is Not One’ (1998) 28(2) Diacritics 28 3-20 at 1. See also J Butler, 
‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’ (1993) 23(4) Diacritics 3-11. 
17 For example, Otto, supra n. 15 at 3, demonstrates how universality can be a site that facilitates 
marginalised voices, ‘transformative’ critiques of rights emerging from ‘non-elite scholars and activists 
on the “margins” of modernity, such as feminists, postcolonial and subaltern groups, lesbians and gay 
men, critical race theorists and indigenous groups’.  
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universalist/cultural relativist binary, as has been the case in many mainstream liberal 
understandings, and giving up on human rights as a site for radical politics, as has been 
the temptation in some critical understandings. Universality can be re-evaluated anew 
in productive ways which go beyond its usages within liberal modernity, but this re-
evaluation must be compelling, and must draw us towards a natural and accessible 
radical account of human rights that is useful in realigning human rights with the 
interests of the marginalised. It is to introduction of such an approach that attention will 
now turn.   
 
3. Re-considering the Universality of Human Rights: Universalisation 
 
3.1 Universality as Universalisation 
 
From the above, the present article seeks to offer a convincing re-engagement with the 
universality of human rights which retains a perception of human rights as universal, 
but asserts that this must be a universality which is radically re-conceived, facilitating 
the move from liberal to radical in a way that has not been achieved to date, and that 
allows alternative possibilities for human rights to come into view through this re-
engagement. The new conception of universality I am advancing rejects the 
universalising mission dominating Western, liberal conceptions of rights, but it goes 
further than this alone. Instead of viewing the universality of human rights as a static, 
inherent characteristic of rights – as both universalist and cultural relativist perspectives 
do – I seek to think through the possibility of exploring the universality of human rights 
as a process of ongoing universalisation. This approach considers universality not as a 
static attribute or characteristic of human rights to be either endorsed or rejected, but as 
a process, an action, a doing which takes place through politico-legal engagements 
with rights and is the very lifeblood of human rights.  
 
The approach to universality I am outlining here fundamentally draws from Judith 
Butler’s work and aims to redeploy it in the context of human rights; to take this work 
as the starting point to develop and propel a more radical theory and practice of 
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universal human rights.18 For Butler, while static conceptions of universality may be 
comforting, they are problematic. The problem emerges ‘when the meaning of “the 
universal” proves to be culturally variable, and the specific cultural articulations of the 
universal work against its claim to a transcultural status’.19 In this respect, the universal 
proves itself to be less than universal. However, this is not a reason to abandon all 
recourse to universality for Butler, ‘on the contrary. All it means is that there are cultural 
conditions for its articulation… and that the term gains its meaning for us precisely 
through these less than universal conditions’.20 It follows that any universal concept is 
‘only partially articulated, and that we do not yet know what forms it may take’ and, as 
Butler continues,  
 
the contingent and cultural character of the existing conventions governing the 
scope of universality does not deny the usefulness of the term universal. It 
simply means that the claim of universality has not been fully or finally made 
and that it remains to be seen whether and how it will be further articulated.21 
 
Thus, the universal always emerges within cultural contexts, is shaped by them, and is 
necessarily limited and always haunted by its own alterity. However, importantly, 
where the one who is outside of the legitimating structure of universality nevertheless 
speaks in its terms ‘such a claim runs the good risk of provoking a radical rearticulation 
of universality itself’. 22  This process of rearticulation is an ongoing necessity, 
maintaining universality as a permanent site of contest, of the ‘not yet’.23 In Butler’s 
words, ‘the excluded, in this sense, constitutes the contingent limit of universalization 
[sic]. And the universal… emerges as a postulated and open-ended ideal that has not 
been adequately encoded’.24 From this outline Butler asserts that it would be a mistake 
to think that ‘conventional formulations exhaust the possibilities of what might be 
                                                        
18 Butler’s comments on universality are mainly outlined in J Butler, ‘Universality in Culture’ in M 
Nussbaum with Respondents, J Cohen (ed), For Love of Country?: A New Democracy Forum on the 
Limits of Patriotism (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996) 45; J Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the 
Performative (New York; London, Routledge, 1997) at 86-92; and J Butler, E Laclau and S Žižek, 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (London, Verso, 2000).  
19 Butler, ‘Universality in Culture’, ibid, at 45. 
20 Ibid, at 45-46. 
21 Ibid, at 46, emphasis in original.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, at 48; Butler, Laclau and Žižek, supra n. 18 at 47. 
24 Butler, ‘Universality in Culture’, supra n. 18 at 48, emphasis in original. 
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meant by “the universal”’ and that insisting on more expansive reformulations of 
universality cannot hold a commitment to honouring only the ‘provisional and 
parochial versions of universality’.25 Instead, exposing the parochialism and alterity 
characterising the universal is part of extending and rendering substantive the notion of 
universality, indeed, such is the process of universalisation itself.  
 
Crucial to this ongoing rearticulation of the universal through exposure of its limits is 
what Butler outlines as the ‘performative contradiction’ posed by those who speak in 
the name of the universal while being excluded from it; ‘claiming to be covered by that 
universal, they expose the contradictory character of previous conventional 
formulations of the universal’.26 The performative contradiction not only exposes the 
limits of current notions of universality, but performatively reworks such limits in more 
expansive and inclusive ways. In this way, ‘the universal begins to become articulated 
precisely through challenges to its existing formulation, and this challenge emerges 
from those who are not covered by it… but nevertheless demand that the universal as 
such ought to be inclusive of them’.27 Through this process the universal emerges as an 
open-ended ideal which can be rearticulated anew and is not restricted to its current 
legal or normative form. In this process of universalisation the universal ‘can be 
articulated only in response to a challenge from (its own) outside’, from the 
unspeakable that it has produced through exclusion.28  
 
Drawing from Butler to articulate the universality of human rights as universalisation 
means starting with already existing approaches to and understandings of human rights, 
but – in contrast to liberal approaches – viewing current universal human rights 
concepts at the international level as not static or fixed but as constantly worked and 
reworked anew in an ongoing process of universalisation; politico-legal work taking 
place in various locations and contexts to seek to fix the subject, content and remit of 
rights through constant articulation and rearticulation in contexts of power. This process 
takes place, for example, when current human rights concepts are challenged by those 
excluded from these concepts. Through utilising the language of human rights when 
                                                        
25 Ibid, at 47. 
26 Ibid, at 48. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, at 49. 
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not entitled to do so, and thereby asserting alternative conceptions of what rights look 
like, such individuals pose a performative contradiction which exposes the limits of the 
current universal and reworks it in a new, more expansive, way.29 Because the universal 
is articulated within culture, competing accounts of universal concepts always exit at 
any one time.30 The assertions made by those with alternative conceptions as to what 
universal human rights should mean, say and look like, who appropriate the language 
of human rights to challenge its current limits, are advancing a competing universal 
which enters into translational dialogue with the currently dominant universal in the 
process of universalisation.31 This dialogue between existing universal concepts and 
people or groups viewing such concepts as inadequate in some way, advancing new 
understandings of them, characterises human rights politics and is the working out of 
the universality of human rights.  
 
Using Butler’s comments as the starting point to ground a new approach to universal 
human rights means understanding the universality of human rights as not defined by 
or contained in a universal subject or content which transcends contexts and borders, 
but by a constant fixing and unfixing of what human rights are, what they can be used 
to do and say, and what they represent which takes place in the diverse politics of rights. 
This process of universalisation is constantly ongoing, will never reach an end. Aiming 
towards an ultimately unachievable final settlement of human rights in some kind of 
perfect, all-inclusive form through contestatory political engagement emerges as indeed 
the raison d’être of universal human rights when we conceive of their universality as 
universalisation. While liberal approaches may recognise that there is a certain amount 
of fluidity within universal human rights concepts to respond and adapt over time and 
context, this is not the same as understanding the universality of human rights as 
universalisation. The reason for this is that such liberal approaches are not located 
within a radical critique of power – where the exclusions and alterity haunting universal 
human rights concepts emerge from the limits and restrictions of liberal regimes of 
power. Understanding universality as universalisation draws our attention to the 
                                                        
29  Butler discusses this idea in terms of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights politics in 
‘Universality in Culture’, Butler, supra n.18. The same has also been discussed in relation to the politics 
of women’s human rights. See, eg, K McNeilly, ‘International Human Rights and Gendered Violence: 
Thinking Non-discrimination Beyond the Sex Binary’ (2014) 22(3) Feminist Legal Studies 263-283. 
30 Butler, Laclau and Žižek, supra n. 18 at 136-181. 
31 This is a process that Butler terms ‘cultural translation’. For further discussion on this idea see Butler, 
Laclau and Žižek, supra n. 18 at 35-41. 
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exclusions of human rights, and how these exclusions are linked to current regimes of 
power, and allows such exclusions to become the focus of human rights politics, 
returning human rights to those on the margins.  
 
It is obvious, therefore, that the approach to the universality of human rights I am 
outlining here begins with what we currently understand about universal human rights 
but appears counter-intuitive to mainstream, liberal understandings of human rights in 
a significant way. This is entirely intentional. Understanding universality as 
universalisation is offered as the first step in engaging with an account of human rights 
which goes beyond liberalism.32 Approaching the universality of human rights as a 
process of ongoing universalisation provides an accessible way to move towards a more 
radical approach to human rights by starting with already existing understandings of 
rights and highlighting the inevitability that they will never be fully complete or fixed, 
but, unlike liberal approaches, highlighting this unfixity as a space for challenge to the 
ways in which current universal human rights concepts are linked to restrictive regimes 
of power. This is a point that we will return to in the final section. For now, in further 
articulating what it means to embrace the universality of human rights as 
universalisation, it is important to explore more of how the reconsideration of 
universality I am posing here naturally departs from liberal understandings of universal 
human rights.  
 
3.2 Distinguishing Universality as Universalisation from Liberal Approaches  
 
The conception of universal human rights as an ongoing process of universalisation 
requires us to approach core aspects of human rights in a fundamentally different way 
than liberal-based approaches to universal human rights and their politics. In what 
follows below three points of divergence will be considered which visibilise how 
considering the universality of human rights as universalisation renders an important 
shift in how we understand and approach the politics of human rights. The first moment 
                                                        
32 For wider literature on human rights beyond liberalism see, for example, I Wall, Human Rights and 
Constituent Power: Without Model or Warranty (London; New York, Routledge, 2012); J Blau and A 
Moncada, Human Rights Beyond the Liberal Vision (Lanham; Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); 
D Ingram, ‘Between Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism: Toward an Alternative 
Theory of Human Rights’ (2003) 3193) Political Theory 359-391. 
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of divergence to note is in relation to the subject of rights. If we conceive of the 
universality of human rights as not a predetermined given but as current content that 
stands to be re-worked based upon that which it currently excludes in processes of 
universalisation, we can no longer unquestionably accept the assertion that ‘all human 
beings are born equal in dignity and rights’. The subject of human rights cannot be 
taken for granted as a universal human subject conceived in a straightforwardly 
biological sense. Rather, the human subject comes into view as a constructed category 
which has been exposed, and continues to be exposed, as limited and exclusive. When 
we reject universalist accounts and their liberal origins, human rights cannot be viewed 
as possessions granted to an already fully formed subject who is born human and born 
equal, but human rights are part of the constant creation and re-creation of the human 
as subject. Here Wendy Brown’s comments are salient; rights operate to produce and 
regulate subjects and in their very promise to protect individuals and to facilitate 
sovereign choices for them rights discourse produces a certain kind of subject in need 
of a certain kind of protection.33  
 
Approaching the universality of human rights as universalisation involves engagement 
with and visibilisation of the fact that the subject of human rights, as a creation of 
power, is not a fixed or natural entity and is one key site for contestation, ongoing 
making and remaking. There is no universal subject of rights, rather the universality of 
human rights is a site to debate the meaning of this subject and reveal, in a way that 
liberal conceptions of human rights currently cannot, the role of power in the creation 
of notions of the human. The finally fixed human subject must also always remain a 
‘not yet’ and a site of contest. This assertion that there is not, and can never be, a settled 
and straightforwardly universal subject of universal human rights does not take away 
the protection contained in the assertion that all humans have rights. On the contrary, it 
seeks to enhance the position of those subjects who are often on the margins – women, 
ethnic communities, those identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender, disabled 
communities – by highlighting the universality of human rights as a place able to 
contest the current power regimes shaping and restricting such subjects, power regimes 
which are hidden in the straightforward assertion that ‘all humans are born equal in 
                                                        
33 W Brown, ‘“The Most We Can Hope For…” Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism’ (2004) 103(2-
3) South Atlantic Quarterly 103 451-463 at 459-460. See also W Brown, ‘Suffering Rights as Paradoxes’ 
(2000) 7(2) Constellations 230-241. 
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dignity and rights’. In this sense, the alternative approach to universality I am 
articulating here allows human rights to be seen and utilised as a vehicle to reveal and 
challenge subjectifying relations of power in a way currently impossible within 
liberalism. It highlights the politics of human rights as a space centred on the ongoing 
contestation of such power and its definition of the subject of rights and thus allows the 
politics of human rights and its relation to the subject to go beyond what Illan Wall 
describes as their current ‘relatively predictable and limited power to reshuffle positions 
within the given distribution [of power]’.34 
 
Secondly, the approach to universality as universalisation differs from liberal 
approaches to universal human rights in relation to the content of human rights. The 
specific content of universal human rights provisions can no longer be viewed as 
universal in the sense of timeless provisions positivised in international law and 
applicable across borders, nations and contexts. Viewing the universality of human 
rights as an ongoing process of universalisation fundamentally highlights the fact that 
the content of human rights is never settled, never timeless, but is always made and 
remade in local contexts through politico-legal engagement with what human rights 
are, what they mean and what they can be used to achieve. The politics of human rights 
is in essence about making and remaking temporarily dominant ideas about what the 
content of international norms and treaty provisions mean in the varied contexts in 
which people are seeking to draw upon them. Viewing human rights and their politics 
in this way moves focus from the need to apply or adapt timeless universal content – as 
advanced in the universalist and cultural relativist positions respectively – and realigns 
focus on universality as a process working out the contingent meanings of rights.  
 
In the approach to universality which I am engaging here, any universal is articulated 
within specific cultural contexts. This is why the universality of human rights in the 
sense of universal content must be constantly made and re-made given that competing 
assertions of such content always exist alongside one another within cultural contexts. 
Commentators, including those from a liberal background, have acknowledged the 
                                                        
34 I Wall, ‘On a Radical Politics for Human Rights’ in Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty (eds), The 
Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 106 at 108. 
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culturally contingent nature of the content of human rights. For example, Jack Donnelly 
rightly points out that the provisions contained in international treaties reflect,  
 
a contingent response to historically specific conditions… An authoritative list 
of human rights emerges out of an ongoing series of political struggles that have 
changed our understanding of human dignity; the major threats (both old and 
new) to that dignity, and the institutions, practices and values necessary to 
protect it.35  
 
However, while Donnelly posits this historical specificity in the content of universal 
human rights as part of the relativity of what he terms the ‘relative universality’ of 
human rights, the new approach to universality I am asserting differs in that it points 
not to some element of relativity within rights, but to the ongoing nature of the 
universalisation process. Characterising how we view such contextual articulation and 
rearticulation of human rights content in this way allows us to move from the tendency 
to view universality as a thing towards viewing it as a doing. Moreover, it also allows 
us to pay more attention to the way in which contextualised processes of articulation 
and rearticulation are related, and respond to, regimes of power. In foregrounding the 
inherently cultural nature of any universal the aim is not to merely observe or accept 
the results of a given articulation, but to highlight and use the alterity within the current 
universal articulation in culture to rework it beyond its present limits, to drive the 
process of universalisation in response to particular relations of power. In this sense the 
cultural nature of any universal does not point towards a hybrid form of relative 
universality, but to the ‘not yet’ which defines the universal and urges us towards an 
understanding of universality as a process of universalisation within the context of a 
critical relation to power.   
 
The third way in which universality as universalisation departs from liberal universalist 
approaches is in relation to the realisation of rights. From the perspective of human 
rights as an ongoing process of universalisation, the realisation of universal human 
rights can never be achieved, but remains fundamentally futural. Just as we must 
continually strive towards a fully inclusive approach to the subject of rights and a fully 
                                                        
35 Donnelly, supra n 9 at 97-98. 
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formed and robust content of rights but can never finally achieve either, so too must we 
always strive towards the achievement of a world where human rights are fully realised 
but yet always fall short of such achievement. Rather than a utopian vision similar to 
that underpinning liberal human rights, however, this view promoted by foregrounding 
the process of universalisation as an ongoing struggle highlights that human rights are 
in many ways a self-critical or self-refuting ideal; they must remain open as a guiding 
concept but one which can never fully be grasped.36 
 
Much of the pressure placed upon the discourse of human rights in their liberal form is 
linked to the fact that despite extensive positivisation, international endorsement and 
development of a robust international human rights regime since the mid 1940s, human 
rights violations are still widespread. A plethora of conflicts, famines, poverty, abuse 
and death has not been prevented by the protections of the liberal human rights 
regime.37  This has led to assertions that human rights are impotent, a discourse that is 
inadequate in eradicating human suffering in the contemporary era, and one that is not 
truly universal. However, if we depart from the traditional, liberal approach to human 
rights and their universality in favour of human rights as a process of ongoing 
universalisation whereby human rights cannot ever be fully realised or fully grasped, 
such assertions can be re-engaged.  
 
Universal human rights have not failed because human rights violations still exist, nor 
because human suffering still proliferates in various locations across the globe. If the 
point of human rights is to encourage engagement in an ongoing process of 
universalisation, continual making and re-making of human rights in a way that can 
never achieve a perfect realisation, we see that it is engagement in this process in itself 
which holds possibilities for those on the margins, rather than the (impossible) output 
of a final realisation or fully complete concept of universal human rights. Human rights 
can never be finally ‘achieved’ in the sense of an answer to the diverse political, social 
and economic problems facing world populations. They are not possessions which can 
                                                        
36 Here I am drawing on Jacques Derrida’s idea of the ‘to come’ outlined in, for example, J Derrida, 
Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (trans P Brault and M Nass) (Stanford, Stanford University Press, CA, 
2005). 
37 See, eg, E Hafner-Burtonm and K Tsutsui, ‘Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights 
Law to Matter Where Needed Most’ (2007) 44(4) Journal of Peace Research 407-425. 
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straightforwardly emancipate or juridically guarantee liberty, security and equality in 
the liberal sense. But the process of contesting and continually rearticulating the subject 
and content of human rights to challenge the limits of currently dominant universal 
concepts and discourses does hold emancipatory potential, differently conceived. 
Entering into this process of ongoing contest offers the possibility to work towards a 
better vision of our living and being together, to performatively bring such into being, 
albeit this is a vision that can never be fully realised or pinned down. This view, rather 
than leading us into inertia, should push us towards a never-ending striving for the 
enhanced concretisation of the values that universal human rights represent and the 
conception of our lives together that they promote which is achieved through an 
ongoing working and reworking of universal concepts and ideas.  
 
From considering these divergences between mainstream, liberal understandings of 
rights and the approach of universality as universalisation we can see that the key 
elements of human rights and their politics comes into view in a very different way. 
The essence of such politics becomes not the positivisation of rights, nor work towards 
enhanced human rights compliance in a measurable sense, but the promise of the world 
that human rights represent – where power relations are radically re-envisaged beyond 
that possible within liberalism – which, while always unachievable and ungraspable in 
full, draws us into a striving towards it. This futural element emancipates human rights 
politics from the ‘failures’ of ongoing rights violations and attempts to uphold a static 
and timeless notion of the subject and content of human rights. Instead, attention may 
be directed towards the possibilities which the discourse and politics of human rights 
offer through understanding universality as a site of ongoing contest within contexts of 
power; the promise of alternative ways of living and being together which address the 
shortcomings of current liberal regimes worked towards through processes of 
universalisation. In this sense, the re-consideration of universality I am advancing here 
offers an approach to human rights and their politics which cannot merely be 
differentiated from current mainstream liberal understandings, but radically challenges 
such liberal understandings, and thereby offers new possibilities for rights to be part of 
wider political activity to rework liberal regimes more generally. It is to elaboration of 
this important assertion that our attention must now turn in order to explore why 
considering universality as universalisation naturally leads us to a radical approach to 
human rights.  
 18 
 
4. Universality as Universalisation: Radical Possibilities 
 
As I stated at the outset, the purpose of this article in returning to the universality of 
human rights and re-engaging it in an alternative way is to contribute in particular to a 
conception of human rights which is compatible with, and useful to, contemporary 
radical politics seeking to challenge liberal regimes and work towards social 
transformation stemming from a reworking of restrictive regimes of power. In this final 
section we will consider further, or more explicitly, the particular elements of 
approaching the universality of rights as universalisation which render it capable of this 
task; the way in which it encourages a critical engagement with power. In doing so, we 
can begin to understand how considering universality as universalisation may help 
reclaim the radical in rights.  
 
As will be clear from discussion so far, when we approach universal human rights 
through the lens of universality as universalisation we come to view human rights as a 
discourse which is inherently fluid, always resisting final achievement, and rights 
politics as characterised by incessant, vivacious activity to this end within a scene of 
power. In this view the meaning, remit, subject and interpretation of human rights can 
never be finally fixed but are constantly made and remade in a variety of contingent 
local and global locations responding to particular situations of exclusion or restriction. 
This making and remaking of universal content is the very purpose and substance of 
rights politics. From the perspective of universality as universalisation, the politics of 
human rights is a fundamentally hegemonic politics, a politics that resists final closure 
and foregrounds a constant struggle with power, a constant striving towards enhanced 
realisation of the values human rights seek to promote through capitalising on the 
inherent unfixity which characterises the universality of human rights. Starting from a 
conception of human rights as inevitably unfixed, and conceiving this with a critical 
eye to power, reveals human rights as being capable of being worked beyond their 
current hegemonic conceptualisation within liberalism to achieve challenge to, as 
opposed to reinforcement of, liberal regimes.  
 
This working of human rights beyond liberalism is made possible because the process 
of universalisation begins with the limitations of, and alterity within, current liberal 
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universals flowing from liberal regimes of power, using this as a starting point to stage 
a performative contradiction. Accordingly, the universality of human rights, as well as 
emerging as the site where the politics of human rights plays out, may also be a 
powerful site for radicalisation of what human rights mean or can be used to say, do 
and achieve. Approaching the universality of human rights as a process of 
universalisation not only radically departs from traditional liberal approaches to 
universality but reveals, feeds from, the concrete exclusions and restrictions of liberal 
concepts and regimes and the need to rework such. In foregrounding universality as a 
site of contest worked and reworked by the performative contradiction of those on the 
margins of the current universal this way of approaching human rights lends itself to 
more radical possibilities for how we conceive, use and understand universal human 
rights, encouraging workings of human rights which are more amenable to the aims of 
radical politics. Therefore, at its core, understanding human rights and their politics as 
characterised by an ongoing process of universalisation involves interrupting the liberal 
parameters of rights, foregrounding those excluded or on the margins of current regimes 
of power as at the centre of rights politics, the driving force of universalisation. 
 
Approaching the universality of human rights as a process of universalisation taking 
place within particular regimes of power, and understanding the politics of human 
rights as driven by the alterity within current liberal understandings of rights, is 
important in terms of facilitating engagement with something often obscured in rights 
– it allows us to return to the radical in rights. While rights have an undoubtedly liberal 
heritage, and their mainstream use throughout most of the twentieth century and into 
the twenty first has been to further discourses of liberal individualism, autonomy and 
choice in a way that converges with liberal democracy, free trade, market economy and 
current distributions of power,38 it is important to remember the radical potential that 
rights and their politics do contain. Illan Wall highlights the double sense of human 
rights; the fact that rights are too often part of, reading Jacques Rancière, ‘the 
configuration of the given’ while also holding a second irruptive character.39 Wall notes 
that ‘traditional international human rights law frameworks, by their nature, miss the 
fact that historically rights were often the tools of sedition’. 40  While this radical 
                                                        
38 Brown, supra n. 33 at 445, 461; Douzinas, supra n 7 at 1, 11; Gearty, supra n. 10 at 7. 
39 Wall, supra n. 34 at 107. 
40 Ibid, at 113. 
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underpinning of the politics and discourse of rights is often hidden by their current 
liberal articulations, Wall asserts that the radically political shadow cast by human 
rights can be detected in senses such as rights being often collective before they are 
individual, often being collective even after they have been established, and the fact 
that rights can often help draw attention to the ‘we’ and the question of being-together.41 
 
Thus, while universal human rights in their current liberal and internationalised form 
can be a conservative force, concealing discourses of power and preventing more than 
a mere reshuffle of current power relations shaping our living and being together, 
human rights have at their heart an impetus towards radical social transformation which 
is amenable to the aims of radical transformation of existing relations of power. The 
politics of human rights has not always been a process of liberal consensus-building 
and tentative engagement with rights within already established parameters, but has 
also been a disturbing of consensus, ‘a dissensus, rupturing and tearing through the 
pacifying tedium of everyday relations, with the demand that things should and could 
be otherwise’.42 This act of dissensus, we can recall from Rancière, is essential to 
disruption of current liberal regimes, a ‘division put in the “common sense”: a dispute 
about what is given, about the frame within which we see something as given’.43 This 
has been made possible when the discourse and practice of human rights allows those 
on the margins to have a voice, to speak back and thereby challenge the exclusions 
haunting current socio-political relations and power regimes.  
 
When we re-engage with the universality of human rights and rethink it as an ongoing 
process of universalisation, a making and remaking of the subject and content of human 
rights in a way which begins with the performative contradiction of those on the 
margins and directs towards a socio-political vision challenging the present order, a 
                                                        
41 Ibid, at 112-113, 115. Wall’s assertion as to how to capitalise on the radical in rights is explored via 
the concept of ‘right-ing’, which he draws from the work of Douzinas, supra n. 7, articulated using re-
engagement with the idea of constituent power.  
42 Ibid, at 109. 
43 J Rancière, ‘Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’ (2004) 103(2-3) The South Atlantic Quarterly 
297-310 at 304. In referencing Rancière’s work in this way it is important to note that the consensus-
driven politics of liberal human rights would be regarded as inherently anti-political for Rancière (see 
further P Tambakaki, Human Rights, or Citizenship? (London, Birkbeck Law Press, 2010) at 88-93). In 
contrast, for more on the way in which Rancière views radical potential in rights as dissensus see L 
McNay, The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory 
(Cambridge, Polity, 2014) at 148-160. 
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way to reignite the radical, dissensual potential in human rights becomes apparent. If 
the aim is no longer to apply universal concepts belonging to an already existing and 
fully formed subject but to engage in a conflictual politics which constantly challenges 
and reworks the very understanding of these concepts via encounters with their own 
alterity, the politics of human rights can be conceived as a space for radical political 
activity which is at its heart about maintaining contest over current hegemonic power 
relations. It is starting from such a new perspective on universality that the politics of 
human rights can break free from conservative tedium and can be part of a project 
towards radical social transformation, beyond the restrictions of liberalism. Indeed, 
such is not only a possibility, but following the view of universality as universalisation 
is the very impetus of human rights politics.  
 
The universality of human rights, therefore, is not just a fundamentally important issue 
for rights in the contemporary era, when re-engaged in the alternative way outlined 
above it offers possibilities to understand and approach human rights anew. Re-
engaging with the universal foundations of human rights in a way which neither 
endorses nor rejects such foundations but approaches universality as a site of contest 
allows the unsettled, and potentially unsettling, nature of rights to come into view, 
contra liberalism. The productive possibility for radical politics from this emerges 
when activists visibilise and capitalise on the fluid, incessant lack of stability inherent 
in universal human rights, existing within power relations, in order to advance the 
claims of those currently marginalised, to challenge the coincidence of human rights 
and capitalist liberal democratic regimes, and utilise the performative contradiction at 
the heart of universality as one vehicle to rework liberal regimes of power. From such 
re-engagement with the universality of human rights a different type of rights politics 
may be facilitated with more radical possibilities to, in Rancière’s words, ‘dispute what 




The universality, or otherwise, of human rights remains a contested issue within 
contemporary discussion and debate on rights. Without doubt forces of globalisation 
                                                        
44 Rancière, ibid.  
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and the ever-expanding reach of the international human rights system have mounted 
new challenges to how the universality of rights can be conceived. Approaching the 
universality of human rights as an ongoing process of universalisation, of ongoing 
contest between competing understandings of what rights are, can do say and achieve, 
is by no means being offered here as a solution to settle these challenges currently 
facing universal human rights or to straightforwardly transition to a smoother, less 
complicated rights politics. Understanding universality as universalisation will indeed 
often lead to the contrary, will foreground contest, will forestall a final conclusion on 
what human rights are and how they can be understood. However, it is only through 
embracing such an unsettled and conflictual understanding of the universality of human 
rights that we can hope to unshackle rights from their current limitations and restrictions 
within liberalism and can begin to see how it may be possible to think of and engage 
with rights in alternative ways in the contemporary era.  
 
This is an understanding particularly pertinent to contemporary activists and scholars 
who aim to disrupt liberal regimes and relations of power in a way that will benefit 
those on the margins, that will work towards radical social transformation. In contrast 
to abandoning human rights as too engrained in liberalism to be of use in such political 
projects, understanding universality as universalisation allows parallels to begin to 
emerge between the politics of human rights, characterised by contest and rearticulation 
of current liberal limitations, and the aims of radical work. Rights may once again be 
imagined as a site for staging dissensus, for articulating claims otherwise invisible and 
inaudible within liberal regimes. In this view, work for radical activists and groups 
becomes about not just using that which liberal human rights currently offer, or do not 
offer, but about using the language of rights even when excluded from it to articulate 
claims currently unimaginable within current universal concepts in order to stage a 
performative contradiction and contribute to the continual rearticulation of rights. This 
rearticulation is aimed towards a view of living and being together which must 
necessarily remain as ‘not yet’ as the universality of rights itself, but draws us into 
striving towards it nevertheless. The universality of human rights, then, is an important 
site to revisit, one that holds promising potential for radical activists and thinkers to 
remember, and begin to reclaim, what is radical about human rights. 
